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In their recent paper “Venting as epistemic work”, Juli Thorson and Christine Baker (2019: 
5) depict venting as a face-to-face action. They deem it to differ from consciousness-raising 
in that the audience of a venting episode may already have their consciousness raised about 
some state of affairs. Its importance is claimed to reside in its emotional helpfulness: it 
enables venters to make “[…] sense of the tangled thoughts and feelings” resulting from the 
epistemic injustice originating it (Thorson and Baker 2019: 6).  
 
Venting succeeds, the authors argue, when the audience understand testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustices, even if implicitly, and have “[…] the right kind of standpoint” 
(Thorson and Baker 2019: 4). This facilitates recognition of the venter’s credibility and may 
prompt the audience to initiate epistemic work by undertaking the appropriate remedial 
action to eradicate the epistemic injustice in question.  
 
Such a remedial action may simply amount to a re-assessment of the venter’s epistemic 
personhood. However, venting may be risky and be likely to cause further epistemic damage, 
Thorson and Baker (2019: 5-6) aver, if someone vents to the wrong person, i.e., a person 
who has already undermined or is prone to undermine her epistemic personhood.  
 
In a previous paper, I have addressed the pragmatic and conversational features that enable 
an adequate and precise characterisation of venting (Padilla Cruz 2019). For it to spark off 
epistemic work, venting must certainly meet certain requisites, which unveil its felicity 
conditions (Searle 1969). In terms of propositional content, venting must focus on a recent or 
past state of affairs. While its preparatory condition establishes that the venter must assess the 
state of affairs as negative or unfair to herself, its sincerity condition determines that the venter 
must genuinely believe the state of affairs to be detrimental to herself.  
 
Finally, its essential condition sets that venting must be an attempt by the venter to have her 
audience recognise that the state of affairs in question has affected her negatively and given 
rise to a variety of feelings like indignation, anger, disappointment, anxiety, etc.  
 
However, a series of issues still deserve consideration in order to gain a fuller understanding 
of why venting can result in epistemic work: 
 
(i) What does having “the right kind of standpoint” involve? 
(ii) When or why may venting actually be dangerous?  
(iii) Can the interactional locus of venting be limited to face-to-face interaction?  
The first issue will be tackled from the angle of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004), a cognitive pragmatic model that considers the 
linguistic properties of utterances and the mental operations that they trigger during 
comprehension. The second issue will be dealt with from an anthropological angle, some 
notions coming from psychology and the sociocultural or sociolinguistic branch of 
pragmatics. More specifically, part of the discussion will rely on concepts and viewpoints 
contributed by politeness theories, which centre on human verbal action, its conflict-generating 
or aggressive potential, and how this is softened or redressed. The last issue will be tackled 
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from the perspective of digital discourse analysis, which looks into communicative behaviour 
through the new technologies and how these are exploited for various social practices and 
purposes. To conclude, in addition to summarising some of the views and ideas this reply 
presents, some suggestions for further research will be given. 
 
On the Achievement of the Effects Associated With Venting 
Thorson and Baker (2019) simply state that venting may result in epistemic work when the 
audience have “the right kind of standpoint” but they do not duly explain what they take 
such a standpoint to amount to. This is something that may be done from a cognitive angle 
by relying on a pragmatic framework concerned with what the human mind does when 
processing intentional stimuli like utterances: Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). In particular, the effect attributed to venting 
may be accounted for on the basis of the relevance-theoretic notions of cognitive environment, 
mutual cognitive environment and metarepresentation. 
 
Individuals represent reality mentally by constructing assumptions or forging beliefs, and 
store those that they regard as true. When a state of affairs actually is, or is likely to be, 
mentally represented, it becomes manifest to an individual, since he in effect entertains, or 
may entertain, (a) belief(s) about it. The whole set of beliefs about states of affairs that he 
entertains makes up his cognitive environment (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 39). Although 
cognitive environments are highly idiosyncratic, those of two or more individuals may be 
similar in some respects, i.e. as regards their contents. If this happens, those individuals share 
a mutual cognitive environment (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 42).  
 
The information that individuals process and mentally represent interacts with already stored 
information in three ways: by lending support to and strengthening old information, by 
contradicting and subsequently eliminating it, or by yielding new information that can only 
be derived from the joint interaction of both old and recently processed information. New 
information coming from such an interaction amounts to contextual implications (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/1995: 108).  
 
On the other hand, utterances are public –i.e. perceptible, audible– representations of either 
other private representations –i.e. thoughts, beliefs– or other public ones –i.e. utterances 
produced by other individuals. Therefore, utterances are metarepresentations of the speaker’s 
own thoughts, but they can also be used to metarepresent the thoughts attributed to other 
individuals or the utterances that they (might) have produced.  
 
In the former case, utterances are descriptive metarepresentations; in the latter, they are 
attributive metarepresentations, as long as there is an (easily) identifiable source of those thoughts 
or utterances. Furthermore, when utterances attributively metarepresent other individuals’ 
thoughts or words, speakers can also express their own attitudes towards the 
metarepresented content. The range of attitudes that they can express includes dissociative, 
endorsing or questioning ones. Expression of any of them renders utterances echoic 
metarepresentations (Wilson 1999; Noh 2000; Sperber 2000). 
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In heavy-load venting episodes where the audience know nothing about the complainable 
beforehand, the venter descriptively metarepresents her own thoughts and thus makes 
manifest to the audience assumptions amounting to new information. If the audience sense 
that the beliefs about the complainable that they forge are similar to those of the venter and 
experience similar feelings about it, there arises a cognitive mutuality or similarity between their 
respective cognitive environments, which is indispensable for those individuals to share a 
common or similar viewpoint. Such a cognitive mutuality will increase if the venter and her 
audience feel that they (can) further derive similar contextual implications from the beliefs 
manifest to themselves (Padilla Cruz 2010, 2012).  
 
It is when such a cognitive mutuality or similarity between the venter and the audience’s 
respective cognitive environments is perceived that venting creates the necessary condition 
leading to epistemic work: the audience is acquainted with a situation, how someone 
experiencing it feels, its potential consequences and, eventually, how to fight it. When the 
audience is unaware of a problematic or unfair situation beforehand, this would be what 
must happen for them to have the right standpoint and be ready to undertake epistemic 
work. 
 
In turn, when the audience already knows about an unfair situation and the venter is 
conscious of this, venting does not only metarepresent and make manifest the venter’s 
beliefs, but also attributively metarepresents beliefs already manifest to the audience. 
Similarity between the venter and the audience’s respective cognitive environments already 
exists, so these intersect in some respects: there is shared information or knowledge about 
what is vented.  
 
Additionally, both the venter and her audience would realise that they do share (a) common 
negative attitude(s) towards the vented state of affairs. Hence, the venter may also 
simultaneously express, in addition to any of the negative attitudes characteristic of venting, 
a further one of endorsement with that of anger, frustration, wrath, etc., which she is certain 
that the audience also hold towards the state of affairs in question (Padilla Cruz 2007, 2008, 
2010).  
 
Consequently, when the audience are familiarised with what is vented, the venter may signal 
“the right kind of standpoint” by attributively metarepresenting beliefs already entertained by 
the audience, expressing her own negative feelings and simultaneously endorsing those of 
the audience. Such an endorsement is essential for venting to incite epistemic work because 
it indicates the alignment of the participants in the verbal episode as regards their viewpoints 
and feelings about the vented unjust state of affairs (Padilla Cruz 2010, 2012). 
 
Why May Venting Be Dangerous? 
Through heavy-load venting the venter achieves cognitive mutuality with her audience, 
whereas in maintenance venting such a mutuality already exists because the venter and her 
audience’s respective cognitive environments intersect in some respects. Venting, however, 
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may be dangerous, and Thorson and Baker (2019) suggest that this may be the case when 
someone vents to the wrong person. If so, that person may inflict further epistemic damage. 
 
The cognitive underpinnings of this undesired effect of venting are to be found mainly in an 
absence of cognitive mutuality, precisely. In other words, the venter and her audience’s 
cognitive environments not only do not intersect, but are different and perhaps (radically) 
opposed. To put it differently, the assumptions about the complainable which are manifest 
to the venter and her audience or the beliefs that these entertain do not match. As a result, 
the venter’s action becomes conflictive, in Leech’s (1983) terms: it questions, challenges or 
even attacks the audience’s viewpoint. Or, in Brown and Levinson’s (1987) view, her action 
amounts to an act threatening the audience’s face. 
 
From an anthropological perspective, individuals are endowed with two quintessential 
attributes: rationality and face. The latter is the private and public self-image that every 
competent member of a sociocultural group claims for himself or herself (Goffman 1959, 
1967). It is a rather vulnerable, two-sided personal attribute consisting of positive face, or the 
desire to be liked, appraised and admired, and feel that one’s actions are perceived as 
desirable or adequate by other people, and negative face, or the desire not to be questioned or 
challenged, and feel that one’s freedom of action is not curtailed by other people or their 
actions (Brown and Levinson 1987: 101, 129).  
 
Threats to face stem from an individual’s own actions but also from other people’s actions, 
so that individuals may put at risk their own positive and negative face, but also those of 
other individuals at the same time. 
 
Face is a complex and non-stable personal attribute liable to constant (re-)negotiation 
actions. Its more specific components may even be defined culturally (Arundale 1999). 
According to Spencer-Oatey (2000, 2008), face may even include what she labels quality face, 
which is linked to an individual’s skills, capacities, role, job, etc., and identity face, which is 
connected with the individual’s self-ascription to a sociocultural group, self-delineation, 
values, beliefs, ideology, viewpoints, etc.  
 
When something is vented to a person with differing ideas or views, the venter is somehow 
challenging that person’s ideas or views, and thus challenging that person’s identity face. Or, 
following Brown and Levinson (1987), the venter threatens her audience’s positive face, as 
their viewpoints, ideas or beliefs about a state of affairs may be implicitly suggested not to be 
desirable, right or adequate. Venting, then, becomes a face-threatening act. 
 
The reason why such challenge or threat arises is to be found in two psychological traits. On 
the one hand, confirmation bias or perseverance of belief (Klayman 1995). This is the human 
tendency to tenaciously adhere to beliefs obtained or conclusions drawn by one’s own means 
and for which enough supportive evidence is thought to exist. Confirmation bias makes 
individuals reluctant to abandon beliefs that they think are well rooted or well founded on 
evidence or reason.  
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As a consequence, individuals become or remain egocentric –the other psychological trait– and 
almost blindly trust their own set of beliefs without further questioning and do not admit 
other individuals’ perspectives. This may also explain why when something is vented to 
someone, venting may turn out dangerous: the hearer might not be open to differing views 
and ready to accept criticism, and would perceive the venter’s action as an attack. To it, he 
would react with some sort of counterattack intended to affirm and secure a safe epistemic 
position where his beliefs remain unquestioned. 
 
On the Face-to-Face Nature of Venting 
Paradoxically, even though the example of venting with which Thorson and Baker (2019) 
begin their discussion is an e-mail received by one of them, they contend that successful 
venting must be a face-to-face activity. In other words, venting must occur in situations 
characterised by the interlocutors’ physical co-presence, where there is immediacy, 
sequentiality and synchronicity in their verbal contributions (Biber 1988).  
 
Such a claim is excessively restrictive and ignores other advantageous, more recent, less 
traditional, less text-based forms of communication where those four features of 
conversational interaction need not be indispensable: computer-mediated communication –
e-mailing, instant messaging, blogs, discussion forums, message boards or websites1– 
mediated social networks –Facebook, Twitter or Instagram, to name but some– or the many 
applications for instant texting.  
 
Venting needs not solely occur in face-to-face contact, but could also be successfully 
accomplished through any of these new technologies, which greatly facilitate visibility or 
exposure by reaching larger audiences (Signorelli 2017: 4). Indeed, venters could benefit 
from what these new technologies now offer in order not to simply achieve their goals, but 
also to increase the impact of their action and secure the desired reaction(s). 
 
The advent and consolidation of new technologies like the computer decades ago, and the 
mobile phone or the smartphone more recently, gave rise to new forms of communication 
that rapidly spread and became new sites for a plethora of social practices (Androutsopoulos 
2011: 281). As the technologies were developed and updated to satisfy further social, 
interactive needs, such forms of communication massively gained adept users and these 
introduced new conventions and ways of interacting: acronyms, lack of punctuation, new 
opening or closing formulae, innovative address forms, briefness in messages, etc. (Gains 
1999; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002; White 2014).  
 
As a result, communication was progressively deprived of its traditional defining features. 
Their absence may involve disadvantages and increase the probability of misunderstanding, 
above all when certain new conventions are unknown (Economidou-Kogetsidis 2011, 2016; 
Padilla Cruz, forthcoming), but the new technologies have attempted to overcome them by 
                                               
1 In technical terms, the difference between a discussion forum and a message board is that the former contains 
chains of comments on an issue or topic that may be read in block, while the latter organises contributions in 
thematic groups that can be selected by users. 
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facilitating an incredibly rich variety of communicative resources that endow interaction 
through them with an additional characteristic: multimodality.  
 
For instance, texting or messaging tools incorporate a wide range of emoticons enabling the 
expression of psychological states (Yus Ramos 2014) and offer the possibility of sending 
images, videos or voice notes. Similarly, e-mail servers, websites, blogs, discussion forums 
and message boards allow various formats for attachments and postings –textual and 
(audio)visual– which enable addition of photographs, drawings, videos, recordings, 
presentations, etc.  
 
Moreover, discussion forums and message boards permit diverse participants to make their 
contributions or replies to a particular message, thus generating polylogues. All these resources 
are not only exploited by the users in order to make their informative intention2 clearer or to 
secure correct understanding by helping other users visualise something, but also affect how 
users carry out their various social practices in the distinct venues that the new technologies 
offer. As a consequence, specific genres have been reshaped and redefined. 
 
Each of the new technologies may be an excellent venue for venting and any communicative 
resource may be exploited for venting. Indeed, photographs, videos or drawings may 
become the first, initial contribution to a potential technology-mediated exchange that will 
actually unfold when (an)other participant(s) react(s) by means of a reply, further comments, 
postings, etc.  
 
Subsequent reactions may give rise to polylogues, threads, (mass) forwarding, sharing, etc. 
Accordingly, it is possible to vent not just orally or textually through more traditional verbal 
means or written media, but also by displaying videos, posting comments, sharing pictures, 
etc. Venting, then, can also be multimodal and polylogal. 
 
In this respect, Signorelli (2017) has shown how members of an online community subvert 
dominant discourses concerning obesity through their messages. Similarly, Garcés-Conejos 
Blitvich (2018) has also explained how a user of the new technologies took advantage of 
them in order to denounce the unfair, prejudiced and racist behaviour of a customer at a 
service encounter.  
 
Smartphone in hand, the user recorded the customer’s offensive, denigrating and abusive 
words on site and posted the video, which was viewed and shared by several other users. 
This sparked off an impressive number of furious comments and reactions that resulted in 
the customer being prosecuted for misconduct, abuse and racism.  
 
 
 
                                               
2 An individual’s informative intention is the intention to make manifest a specific set of assumptions, i.e. the 
intention to transmit a specific message (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). 
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Conclusion 
When the audience is not previously acquainted with the topic of venting, the venter 
metarepresents and makes manifest her own viewpoints, and voices her negative feelings 
with a view to achieving cognitive mutuality with her audience. If the audience is already 
aware of its topic, the venter metarepresents the thoughts and ideas that she attributes to 
them, and endorses their negative feelings.  
 
Thus, the venter hints that cognitive mutuality between her and the audience actually exists. 
Cognitive mutuality increases when the audience feel that they can draw contextual 
implications that are similar to those that the venter can draw.  
 
Cognitive mutuality is essential for achieving the pursued effects through venting, as it 
involves an alignment between the venter and her audience. If their cognitive environments 
are not mutual and do not intersect in any respect, venting may be perceived as a questioning 
of the audience’s ideas, ultimately threatening their identity. This is why venting may be 
dangerous and lead to further epistemic damage: the audience may attempt to secure their 
epistemic position by counterattacking. 
 
Venting cannot be limited to traditional forms of social interaction such as face-to-face 
verbal communication or written communication. On the contrary, it may appear in more 
recent technology-mediated forms of communication, which potential venters can certainly 
take advantage of with a view to reaching larger audiences and magnifying its impact. The 
new and fascinating challenge that pragmatists, analysts of mediated discourse and 
communication, researchers in the new technologies and social epistemologists interested in 
venting now face is to examine and account for the dynamics of newer technology-based 
forms of venting and their contribution to fighting and eradicating injustices and inequalities.  
 
Future research could look into the characteristics of and constraints on multimodal and 
polylogal venting, and ascertain their effectiveness. Scholars could additionally examine 
strategies and techniques deployed in order to increase the exposure of vented states of 
affairs and the (dis)advantages of specific media or venues. It could also be illuminating to 
investigate if venting can blend with or shade into other actions such as shaming.  
 
These are just some avenues for future research which will surely shed much light onto this 
social and epistemic practice and its consequences, and widen our understanding thereof. 
 
Contact details: mpadillacruz@us.es 
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